Cognitive control and individual differences in economic ultimatum decision-making by De Neys, Wim et al.
Cognitive Control and Individual Differences in Economic
Ultimatum Decision-Making
Wim De Neys1*, Nikolay Novitskiy2, Leen Geeraerts3, Jennifer Ramautar4, Johan Wagemans2
1Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University of Toulouse, Toulouse, France, 2 Lab Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium,
3Department of Economics and Applied Economics, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, 4Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
Much publicity has been given to the fact that people’s economic decisions often deviate from the rational predictions of
standard economic models. In the classic ultimatum game, for example, most people turn down financial gains by rejecting
unequal monetary splits. The present study points to neglected individual differences in this debate. After participants
played the ultimatum game we tested for individual differences in cognitive control capacity of the most and least
economic responders. The key finding was that people who were higher in cognitive control, as measured by behavioral
(Go/No-Go performance) and neural (No-Go N2 amplitude) markers, did tend to behave more in line with the standard
models and showed increased acceptance of unequal splits. Hence, the cognitively highest scoring decision-makers were
more likely to maximize their monetary payoffs and adhere to the standard economic predictions. Findings question
popular claims with respect to the rejection of standard economic models and the irrationality of human economic
decision-making.
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Introduction
In recent years much publicity has been given to the fact that
people’s economic decisions often deviate from the rational
predictions of traditional economic models [1–3]. One of the
prime showpieces of people’s apparently irrational economic
behavior is provided by a simple game known as the Ultimatum
Game [4]. In the game two players have to split a sum of money.
One player (the proposer) makes an offer as to how the money
should be split between the two. The other player (the responder)
can either accept or reject this offer. If the responder accepts, the
deal goes ahead as planned. However, if the responder rejects the
offer, then neither player receives anything. Both players are fully
aware of the rules of the game and once the decision is made, the
game is over.
Standard economic models prescribe that the optimal solution is
for the proposer to offer as little as possible, and for the responder
to accept this small amount on the rational grounds that earning
something is better than earning nothing. In economic game
theory this solution is known as the Nash Equilibrium (after the
Nobel prize winning economist J. F. Nash). However, numerous
experimental studies over the last two decades have indicated that
people’s actual behavior does not resemble the Nash Equilibrium
predictions: Proposers most commonly offer an even split (i.e., the
money is split 50:50) and responders typically reject an uneven
split in which they are only offered a small amount [1].
Psychological research indicated that people’s decision to reject
is driven by strong emotional motives [3,5–9]. Uneven splits and
small offers are perceived as unfair and provoke an angry reaction.
This strong emotional reaction leads people to sacrifice consider-
able financial gain in order to punish their partner for the slight.
Hence, contrary to the century old characterization of the human
decision-maker as motivated by rational deliberation, human
economic decisions seemed to be primarily driven by emotional
impulses.
While these findings have helped economists to start taking
psychological and emotional factors into account they also led to a
questioning of the standard economic models and the rationality of
human decision-makers (e.g., [1,3]). This questioning has been
amplified by ultimatum research in special populations that
showed that, for example, chimpanzees or very young children do
tend to accept unfair splits [10,11]. Ironically, such findings
seemed to suggest that behaving in line with the standard
economic models is characterized by less cognitive sophistication.
Clearly, this tends to further undermine the value of the standard
economic models [1]. As one popular science website put it, the
fact that the ‘‘homo economicus’’ envisaged by the standard
models turns out to be a monkey is not making economist or the
human race look good [12].
In the present paper we point to a basic but somewhat neglected
issue in this debate. Studies of economic decision-making in the
general population have typically focused on explaining aggregate
behavior with little interest paid to individual differences [13]. For
example, in the ultimatum game, researchers’ attention has been
primarily captured by the fact that most healthy adults typically
reject uneven splits. However, although the majority of responders
rejects uneven splits, there is always a small minority who does
accept them and behaves in line with the standard economic
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model. Clearly, a key question is what characterizes this minority.
In the present study we explore the possibility that the tendency to
accept unfair offers is mediated by cognitive control abilities. We
hypothesize that people who have a superior cognitive capacity to
override impulsive behavior will better manage to control the
emotional impulse to reject uneven splits. Consequently, contrary
to what might seem to be suggested by primate or developmental
research, we predict that in the general human population,
individuals with the highest control abilities should be more likely
to adhere to the rational Nash Equilibrium solution.
Our basic hypothesis was inspired by individual differences
studies on logical and probabilistic reasoning (e.g., [14–16]). These
studies indicated that although most people are typically biased
when they engage in logical or probabilistic reasoning, participants
highest in cognitive control capacity do manage to reason in line
with standard logical or probabilistic models. More specifically, it
has been shown that a high control ability allows high control
reasoners to override erroneous but highly salient intuitively cued
responses that bias their less fortunate counterparts (e.g., [16–18]).
Clearly, in and by itself, the fact that one is more likely to behave
in line with a standard logical or probabilistic model in a reasoning
task, does not imply that one will also be more likely to behave in
line with standard economic models during economic decision-
making (but see [19]). However, the fact that cognitive control
capacity has been shown to help control impulsive intuitive
responses during reasoning lends some credence to the idea that it
might also help to counter the cued emotional impulses in the
ultimatum game.
More specific support for our hypothesis comes from neuroim-
aging work with the ultimatum game (e.g., [3,20]). Sanfey and
colleagues, for example, showed that unfair offers mainly elicit
activity in brain areas that are related to emotional (anterior
insula) and cognitive control processing (lateral prefrontal cortex).
The critical finding was that for accepted unfair offers the lateral
prefrontal activation was stronger than the insula activation,
whereas the reverse was true for rejected unfair offers [3]. The
lateral prefrontal cortex has been linked to cognitive control
processes such as overriding impulsive responses [21]. Hence,
although the imaging findings do not allow us to draw strong
individual differences conclusions they at least suggest that
increased cognitive control processing is associated with more
economic responses (e.g., [20]). In the present study we tested our
claim directly by examining the link between individuals’
ultimatum game performance and behavioral and neurological
correlates of their cognitive control capacity. We also validated the
functionality of cognitive control resources for economic decision-
making by examining ultimatum game performance under
cognitive load.
In the study we first invited a large number of participants for
an initial screening session in which they played the Ultimatum
Game in the role of responder. Based on the screening we invited a
group of the most and least economical responders (i.e.,
participants who most and least accepted unfair offers) for a
follow-up study in which they were presented with a Go/No-No
task while electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. The Go/
No-Go task is a classic task that is widely used to measure people’s
basic cognitive control abilities (e.g., [22,23]). In the task
participants must quickly respond to a frequently presented Go
stimulus such that the ‘Go’ response becomes habitual. However,
on a small proportion of trials, a No-Go stimulus appears,
signaling that one’s habitual response should be withheld. Hence,
a No-Go stimulus conflicts with the prepotent Go response
tendency. People’s accuracy on the No-Go trials is an excellent
marker of their basic ability to control impulsive responding.
Consequently, if we are right that individuals who accept unfair
offers are characterized by higher cognitive control abilities, we
predict that at the behavioral level, the most economical
responders will excel in the Go/No-Go task and outperform the
least economical responders.
The EEG recording allowed us to test for a possible neurological
marker of the differential control capacities of the least and most
economical thinkers. Correctly solved No-Go trials on which
participants manage to withhold the dominant ‘Go’ response give
rise to a specific event-related potential (ERP) component referred
to as the No-Go N2. The No-Go N2 is a sharp negative voltage
deflection in the EEG that typically peaks about 200 ms after the
stimulus onset. The No-Go N2 is believed to reflect cognitive
control activity associated with successful monitoring or overriding
of the prepotent Go response [23].
Available evidence suggests that the few times that people with
less developed cognitive control abilities do manage to withhold the
Go response, the N2 amplitude is larger than for people with high
control abilities (e.g., [24–28] but see also [29,30]). Some have
interpreted this larger No-Go N2 amplitude as reflecting the fact
that people who have fewer cognitive control resources will need a
much higher activation of the neural control structures for the
response inhibition to be successful [27,28]. Others, such as
Nieuwenhuis and colleagues [23], argued that the No-Go N2
reflects a conflict related reaction to the No-Go stimulus as a cue to
change one’s prepotent behavioral response. Under this interpre-
tation the No-Go N2 amplitude may reflect the degree of conflict
that is required to change one’s habitual response rather than the
response override per se. People with high control ability will be
more accurate on No-Go trials precisely because they are more
responsive to conflict and will change their habitual response at the
slightest sign of it. People lower in control ability will need much
more conflict-related activation in order to achieve this habitual
response change. Consequently, the few times that individuals low
in cognitive control manage to change their prepotent Go response
and solve a No-Go trial correctly, this will be associated with high
levels of conflict-related activation and larger No-Go N2 amplitude.
In sum, although there is some debate regarding the precise
interpretation of the No-Go N2, it is well established that
individual differences in cognitive control ability affect the No-
Go N2 amplitude. Consequently, if economical responders in the
ultimatum game are indeed characterized by high cognitive
control abilities, we should not only observe a different behavioral
No-Go performance in the two groups but also a differential,
presumably smaller, No-Go N2 component for the most economic
responders.
Methods
Ethics statement
All experiments in this study were conducted in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the local ethics
committee of the University of Leuven. Written informed consent
was obtained from all participants.
Ultimatum Screening
Participants. A total of 403 psychology undergraduates
participated in return for course credit. Ten participants were
randomly selected and received additional payment based on their
earnings in the ultimatum game. Participants provided written
informed consent and the study was approved by the local ethics
committee of the University of Leuven.
Material. Ultimatum Game. Our ultimatum game procedure
was based on the work of van’t Wout and Sanfey (e.g., [3,5]).
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Participants played a total of 10 one-shot games with 10 different
proposers. Participants always played the role of the responder.
Participants were presented with a picture of their proposer, after
which the proposal was presented and participants could accept or
reject the offer (see Figure 1). Participants were clearly instructed
that they would play a single round of the game with each
proposer and that the proposers were not informed about the
participants’ decisions in previous rounds. Each round involved
splitting J10. The offers adhered to a predetermined algorithm.
Half of the presented offers were control trials in which the
proposer offered to split the money evenly (J5: J5). The other half
were the critical trials in which the participants were presented
with an unequal split in which the proposer wanted to keep the
larger part (two offers of J9: J1, two offers of J8: J2, and one
offer of J7: J3). We will refer to the control and critical trials as
fair and unfair trials, respectively. The different offers were
presented in random order. Participants were informed that 10
randomly selected participants would receive the total amount of
money they made in the game.
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). After participants finished playing
the ultimatum game they completed a number of unrelated tasks and
were presented with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, see [15]).
The CRT is a very short, 3-item questionnaire designed to measure
people’s ability to refrain from impulsive responding in a reasoning
context. The test shows good correlations with standard cognitive
ability tests and quantitative SAT scores. The brief test was translated
in Dutch (see [31]) and included as a raw proxy of people’s cognitive
control capacities. The measure allowed us to have a first, explorative
look at the association between an individual’s behavioral control
ability and ultimatum game performance.
Go/No-Go EEG Study
Participants. After the ultimatum screening nine of the least
and nine of the most economical responders (i.e., screening study
participants whose unfair trial acceptance rate scored in the
bottom and top quartile, respectively) were recruited for the main
Go/No-Go EEG study. Participants were paid J25 for their
participation. Participants provided written informed consent and
the study was approved by the local ethics committee of the
University of Leuven.
Material. Go/No-Go task. The Go/No-Go task was based on
the procedure introduced by Nieuwenhuis and Amodio (e.g.,
[22,23]). On each trial, either the letter ‘‘M’’ or ‘‘W’’ was
presented in the center of a computer screen. Approximately half
of the participants in each group were instructed to make a ‘‘Go’’
response (mouse button press) when they saw ‘‘M’’ but to make no
response when they saw ‘‘W’’; the remaining participants
completed a version in which ‘‘W’’ was the Go stimulus and
‘‘M’’ the No-Go stimulus. Each trial began with a fixation point,
presented for 500 ms. The target then appeared for 100 ms,
followed by a blank screen. Participants were instructed to respond
within 500 ms of target onset. A warning message appeared on the
screen for 1 s after responses that exceeded this deadline and after
erroneous responses. The inter trial interval was 1 s.
The task consisted of 600 trials: 80% Go trials and 20% No-Go
trials. The high frequency of Go trials induced a prepotent ‘‘Go’’
response, enhancing the difficulty of successfully overriding a
response on the critical No-Go trials. Participants received a short
2-min break after every 150 trials. As one reviewer remarked, one
might note that the Go/No-Go task involves the override of an
experimentally acquired tendency whereas the ultimatum game
involves the override of an alleged ‘‘natural’’ tendency. In theory
this could affect the predictive power of the Go/No-Go task.
Nevertheless, prior research already showed that the Go/No-Go
task is a good predictor of the override efficiency across a wide-
range of domains (e.g., [25,27,28]).
Procedure
EEG recording. Participants were fitted with a Quickcap,
and EEG was collected from 128 equidistantly positioned scalp
Figure 1. Timeline for a single ultimatum game round. Note that the player picture is anonymized for publication.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027107.g001
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sites using Ag/AgCl electrodes. The active reference electrode was
placed on the vertex between electrodes Cz and Cpz. A ground
electrode was placed on the forehead close to AFz. Vertical and
horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) was collected to permit the
reduction of the artifact due to eye movements. Impedances were
below 5 kV at each scalp site. EEG was recorded through a 0.15–
30 Hz bandpass filter and digitized at 1000 Hz using a SynAmps2
amplifier. Data were re-referenced to the average earlobe. Offline,
we used a computerized algorithm [32] to remove eye-blink
artifacts. EEG epochs with voltage exceeding +/- 200 mV were
rejected as reflecting additional artefact.
ERP N2 processing. Our quantification of the N2 was based
on the work of Amodio and colleagues [22]. A 1000 ms epoch of
EEG signal, beginning 200 ms prior to stimulus onset, was selected
for each artifact-free trial. Baseline correction procedures
subtracted the average voltage during the 200 ms interval before
stimulus onset within each epoch from the entire epoch. Epochs
associated with correct responses on Go and No-Go trials were
averaged within their respective trial types. The N2 was scored as
the peak negative deflection occurring between 200 and 400 ms,
relative to target onset, at the vertex site (Cz), where it is typically
maximal. The critical No-Go N2 component refers to the average
N2 amplitude associated with correct ‘‘No-Go’’ responses. For
control purposes we also calculated the average N2 amplitude,
scored according to the same criteria, associated with correct
‘‘Go’’ responses. We will refer to this component as the Go N2.
Ultimatum Load Study
If our Go/No-Go EEG study were to show that more economic
ultimatum responders are indeed characterized by better cognitive
control capacity, this does not yet establish that the better
economic performance is driven by cognitive control resources per
se. That is, it cannot be excluded that other factors account for the
association. We already noted, for example, that chimpanzees and
young children also tend to accept unfair offers (e.g., [10,11]). This
behavior has been attributed to the fact that these populations
show no or, in the case of children, a far less intense emotional
reaction to an unequal split. The same point has been made with
respect to the remarkably high unfair offer acceptance rate of
autistic patients and certain tribes living in isolated cultures, for
example [1]. Hence, in sharp contrast with the typical western
adult human, accepting an unfair offer does not require overriding
any prepotent emotional response in these special groups. Clearly,
given this override redundancy, the high acceptance rate in these
groups is not surprising. However, the issue does point to a
possible alternative explanation for our findings. One might argue
that, just like monkeys, people higher in cognitive control capacity
are simply less emotional and do not need to override an
emotional response to accept an unfair offer. Hence, the higher
cognitive control capacities of people who behave more econom-
ically might be an epiphenomenal coincidence and play no
functional role in their economic decision-making.
To address this issue we asked a group of participants with
superior cognitive control capacities to play the ultimatum game
while their control resources were burdened with a demanding
secondary task. If people’s superior cognitive control capacities are
critical to override emotional impulses, cognitive load will reduce
the efficiency of the override and hamper performance. However,
if people with a superior control capacity are simply less emotional
and their cognitive control capacity is not functional for their
economic behavior, their ultimatum performance should not be
affected by an experimental reduction of the available cognitive
resources.
Participants
We selected 36 participants for the ultimatum load study based
on an initial screening in which 200 undergraduates were
presented with a Go/No-Go task. The Go/No-Go task was
similar as in the EEG study except that participants played only
150 trials. Participants who scored in the top quartile were invited
for participation in the ultimatum game study. Participants
received course credit in return for participation in the screening
and ultimatum study. In addition, five ultimatum participants were
randomly selected and received payment based on their earnings
in the ultimatum game. All participants provided written informed
consent and the study was approved by the local ethics committee
of the University of Leuven.
Material
Half of the selected participants were randomly asked to play
the ultimatum game under dual task load. The other half played
without additional load. A control analysis established that the
cognitive control capacity, as measured by the No-Go accuracy,
did not differ in the load and no load group, F(1, 34),1. The
ultimatum game was similar as in our EEG screening study. The
dual task procedure was based on the work of De Neys [17].
Participants in the load group were presented with a to-be-
memorized dot pattern before the offer was presented. After
participants had entered their response an empty grid appeared
and participants were asked to reproduce the dot pattern (see
Figure 2). The dot memorization task has been shown to efficiently
tap executive control resources [33].
Results
Ultimatum Screening
The ultimatum game behavior of our screening sample
replicated the typical results in previous studies. Overall, people
tended to reject an unequal split in which the proposer wanted to
keep the largest part. Average acceptance rate for the unfair trials
was only 20% (SE=1.3). The larger the part the proposer wanted
to keep, the less the unfair offer was accepted (7:3 split = 45%,
SE=2.1; 8:2 split = 17%, SE=1.3; 9:1 split = 11%, SE=1.3, F(2,
804) = 156.25, p,.00001, 2p = .28). Equal splits, however, were
typically accepted. In contrast with the unfair trials, the acceptance
rate reached 98% (SE= .3) on the fair control trials, F(1,
402) = 3502.9, p,.00001, 2p = .9.
The average CRT score in the sample was 1.12 (out of 3,
SE= .05). As we expected, there was a significant correlation
between people’s acceptance rate on the unfair ultimatum trials
and their CRT scores, r = .27, p,.00001. Hence, people who
tended to accept the critical unfair offers did show higher CRT
scores. Obviously, acceptance rates of the almost perfectly
accepted fair offers did not depend on CRT performance,
r =2.01, p = .7740. This establishes that participants with low
CRT scores do not simply show a general tendency to reject offers.
On the fair trials, where the money is split evenly, people with
lower CRT scores do accept the offer. As one would expect, it is
only when the money is split unequally and accepting requires
overriding a negative emotional impulse that individual differences
in cognitive control (as measured by the CRT at least) will matter.
Non-parametric correlation tests confirmed the findings (Spear-
man rank-order correlation CRT-unfair trials acceptance = .19,
p = .0002; Spearman rank-order correlation CRT-fair trials
acceptance = .2.04, p= .3864). The interested reader can find
an illustration of these trends in Figure S1.
Two months after the initial screening we invited a group of the
least (i.e., participants who never accepted an unfair offer) and
Cognitive Control and Ultimatum Game
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most economical responders (i.e., participants who accepted unfair
offers more than once) to participate in the main EEG study.
These cutoff values corresponded to the top and bottom quartile of
the acceptance rates on the unfair trials. All participants were
invited by email to participate. Time-constraints forced us to
restrict the number of recruited participants for the EEG study to
the first nine participants from each group who responded.
Go/No-Go EEG Study
Behavioral findings. The average accuracy on the Go and
No-Go trials of participants in our group of least and most
economic ultimatum game responders was entered in a 2 (Go/No-
Go trial)62 (economic group) mixed model ANOVA. Figure 3
shows the results. There was a main effect of the trial type, F(1,
16) = 119.48, p,.00001, 2p = .88, and economic group factor,
F(1, 16) = 11.50, p = .0037, 2p = .42. The two factors also
interacted, F(1, 16) = 10.60, p = .0049, 2p = .40. Planned
contrasts showed that, as expected, the most economic
responders outperformed the least economic group on the
critical No-Go trials where correct responding required
controlling the impulsive Go response, F(1, 16) = 11.14,
p = .0042, 2p = .75. As Figure 3 shows, both groups performed
equally well on the Go trials where overriding the impulsive
response was not required, F(1, 16) = 3.58, p = .0766.
Neurological findings. As expected, our ERP data indicated
that the average No-Go N2 amplitude differed in the group of
most and least economic thinkers, F(1, 16) = 6.85, p = .0187,
2
p = .30. As Figure 4 shows, whenever the least economic thinkers
did manage to solve No-Go trials correctly this was accompanied
by a more pronounced No-Go N2 amplitude (i.e., a more negative
deflection). A control analysis established that the least economic
thinkers did not simply show a general tendency towards more
negative ERP deflections. The Go N2 (i.e., our control ERP
associated with correctly solved Go responses, scored to
correspond to the No-Go N2) did not differ for the most and
least economic responders group, F(1, 16),1. Hence, in line with
the behavioral findings, the N2 only differed when correct
responding required overriding an impulsive response.
For completeness, we also entered the No-Go N2 and control
Go N2 data in a mixed model ANOVA with Trial type (No-Go or
Go) as within-subjects factor and Economic Group (least or most
economic) as between-subjects factor. The main effects of Trial
Type, F(1, 16),1, and Economic Group, F(1, 16) = 1.59, were not
significant, but as expected the two factors interacted, F(1,
16) = 4.49, p= .0499, 2p = .22. As indicated above, the N2 only
differed significantly between the groups on the critical No-Go
trials, F(1, 16) = 6.85, p= .0187, 2p = .30. This pattern is
illustrated in Figure 5.
Ultimatum Load Study
An initial control analysis indicated that the load task was
properly performed. On average 94% (i.e., 3.76 out of 4 dots,
SE= .12) of the dots were correctly memorized. Next, the
acceptance rates on fair and unfair trials of participants in the
load and no-load group were entered in a 2 (fair or unfair trial)62
(load or no-load group) mixed model ANOVA. Figure 6 shows the
results. There was a main effect of the trial type, F(1, 34) = 129.66,
p,.00001, 2p = .79, and load factor, F(1, 34) = 4.40, p = .0433,
2
p = .12. As Figure 6 indicates, the two factors also tended to
interact, F(1, 34) = 3.60, p = .0662, 2p = .10. Planned contrast
showed that the cognitive load decreased the acceptance rates on
the critical unfair trials, F(1, 34) = 4.31, p,.0456, 2p = .11.
However, the load did not affect performance on the fair trials,
F(1, 34),1. This pattern establishes that the decreased acceptance
rate on the unfair trials cannot be attributed to a dual task
confound. It is not the case that cognitive load simply results in a
general tendency to reject offers. As expected, cognitive capacity
only matters on the unfair trials where the unequal split is expected
to cue an impulsive rejection response.
Discussion
In the present study we pointed to neglected individual
differences in economic decision making. In line with previous
psychological studies we observed that contrary to the predictions
of standard economic models, the vast majority of participants
Figure 2. Timeline for a single ultimatum game round under secondary task load. Note that the player picture is anonymized for
publication.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027107.g002
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turned down monetary gains and rejected unequal splits when
playing the ultimatum game. However, the key finding is that
people who are higher in cognitive control, as measured both by
behavioral (Go/No-Go performance) and neural markers (No-Go
N2 amplitude), do tend to behave more in line with the standard
economic models and are more likely to accept unequal splits. Our
cognitive load study established that this increased acceptance
behavior is indeed mediated by the cognitive control resources.
Hence, the cognitively highest-scoring decision-makers’ economic
behavior does tend to more closely resemble the game theoretic
Nash Equilibrium predictions. The net consequence is that these
cognitively highest-scoring players will be the ones who end up
with the highest monetary gains.
We noted that the observed deviations of people’s behavior
from the standard economical predictions have resulted in a
questioning of the economic models and the rationality of human
Figure 3. Go/No-Go task accuracy. Error bars are standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027107.g003
Figure 4. ERP waveforms. Waveforms corresponding to correct No-Go responses, with the waveform for correct Go responses subtracted, for the
least and most economic ultimatum game responders are shown (stimulus presented at 0 ms; N2 peaked at 278 ms at Cz). The inset shows the
voltage map of the scalp distribution of the resulting N2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027107.g004
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decision-makers [1,3]. Since the standard models describe how a
perfectly rational being that maximizes its payoffs should behave,
people’s failure to behave in line with these prescriptions can be
interpreted as pointing to the irrationality of the human species. At
the same time, one can also argue that the models’ prediction
failures point to a need to improve and revise the models. The
present individual differences findings indicate that both these
claims need to be qualified. Although there might be a lot of
people whose behavior conflicts with rational predictions, some
people do tend to behave more rationally. Our study indicates that
these decision-makers are typically those individuals highest in
cognitive control ability. This should help to counter strong claims
Figure 5. Average peak No-Go and peak Go N2 amplitude. Errors bars are standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027107.g005
Figure 6. Impact of cognitive load on fair and unfair offer acceptance. Error bars are standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027107.g006
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with respect to the irrationality of the human economic decision-
makers. In addition, the individual differences also qualify the
claim to revise the standard models. Clearly, for some people,
specifically those highest in cognitive control abilities, economic
decisions are much more in line with the predictions of the
standard models. Any proposed revision of the standard models
will need to take this individual variance into account.
We mentioned that neuroimaging studies have indicated that
accepting unfair offers is associated with increased lateral
prefrontal activation (e.g., [3,20]). As we pointed out, in line with
the present findings, this lateral prefrontal region is believed to
mediate cognitive control processes such as overriding impulsive
responses [21]. However, with respect to the precise neural basis of
the rejection override in the ultimatum game it is interesting to
consider the recent findings of Knoch and colleagues (e.g., [34-
36]). Using both repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
(rTMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), Knoch
and colleagues showed that deactivation of the (dorsal) lateral
prefrontal cortex resulted in an increased acceptance of unfair
offers (see also [37]). As Knoch and colleagues argued, this either
indicates that it is the rejection of unfair answers that requires
control resources or that the lateral prefrontal cortex is involved in
the mediation of the emotional response to unfairness. Van’t Wout
and colleagues [37] and Tabibnia and colleagues [20] already
argued for this latter possibility and suggested that the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, i.e., the part of the lateral prefrontal
cortex that was deactivated in the Knoch [35,36] and van’t Wout
[37] studies) is specifically involved in emotional goal mainte-
nance. Hence, when rTMS or tDCS deactivate this dorsolateral
area, subjects will no longer experience a willingness to reject
unfair offers (because the ‘‘rejection’’ goal is no longer main-
tained). Bluntly put, rTMS or tDCS over the DLPFC would turn
participants in virtual monkeys who no longer feel an emotional
trigger to reject and consequently have little trouble in accepting
the unfair offer. Note that under this interpretation it is the more
ventral part of the lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) that is
believed to be responsible for the actual response override and
mediation of cognitive control related processing during the
ultimatum game. Consistent with this view, Tabibnia and
colleagues [20] already observed that a higher acceptance rate
of unfair offers was more strongly associated with VLPFC than
DLPFC activation. Interestingly, in light of the present findings
this suggests that individual differences in cognitive control
capacity might also be specifically reflected in a differential
VLPFC (rather than DLPFC) recruitment during the ultimatum
game. Obviously, the present study was not designed to address
this localization question and the hypothesis will need to be
validated in future studies.
With respect to the implications of our study it should be clear
that we do not argue that cognitive control capacity is the only
factor affecting ultimatum game performance. The goal of our
study was to point to the role of individual differences in cognitive
control capacity in economic decision making. We demonstrated
that people who are higher in cognitive control tend to behave
more in line with traditional models and are more likely to accept
unfair offers. However, as we stated, it has been shown that
monkeys, young children, or people with certain disorders also
accept unfair offers (e.g., [1,10,11]). Hence, it is evident that not
everybody who accepts an unfair offer will necessarily have a
superior cognitive capacity. Likewise, not everybody with a
superior cognitive capacity will always accept unfair offers. This
point is underlined by our CRT analysis which indicates that the
relation between cognitive capacity and the unfair offer accep-
tance is far from perfect. As we clarified, the idea is that cognitive
control capacity matters because it is needed to override the
emotional impulse to reject an uneven split. Obviously, any factor
that affects the intensity of the emotional response will by
definition also affect one’s ultimatum behavior. Hence, if for one
or the other reason the emotional response is not generated or less
intense, unfair offers will also be accepted irrespective of one’s
control capacities. On the other hand, in the presence of factors
that increase ones emotional reactivity to unfair offers (e.g.,
possible psychopathic personality traits, see [38]) even high control
capacities might not suffice to counter the rejection response. In
general, previous ultimatum game research has already pointed to
the mediating role of such factors as the role of social concerns and
the perceived intentions of the proposer (e.g., [36,39,40]). For
example, some people might be instinctively driven to accept
unfair offers to preserve their reputation and preventing them to
be perceived as someone who is so poor or so attracted by money
to accept little sums [36]. Cleary, our study does not argue against
the role of these factors. To the extent that they can modulate or
bypass the emotional rejection response they will directly affect the
mediating role of cognitive control capacity. What we tried to
highlight, however, is that the overall relationship between
cognitive control capacity and unfair ultimatum offer acceptance
is positive and that our load findings establish that cognitive
control directly facilitates the acceptance of unfair offers. This
presents an interesting addition to the widely publicized ultimatum
game studies with special populations and clarifies that behaving in
line with traditional economic standards is not necessarily
characterized by less cognitive sophistication.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Figures illustrating the association between ultimatum
game performance and Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) scores.
Panel A (fair trials) and panel B (unfair trials) show frequency
scatterplots. Panel C shows the average acceptance of unfair and
fair trials as a function of CRT score.
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